An optimal test for strategic interaction in network formation games

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Abstract

Consider a setting where N players, partitioned into K observable types, form a directed network. Agents' preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g., agents may have preferences over their network centrality) and a private, or dyadic, component which is additively separable in own links. This latter component allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the costs of sending and receiving links across agents (respectively out- and in- degree heterogeneity) as well as homophily/heterophily across the K types of agents. In contrast, the network benefit function allows agents' preferences over links to vary with the presence or absence of links elsewhere in the network (and hence with the link formation behavior of their peers). In the null model, which excludes the network benefit function, links form independently across dyads in the manner described by Charbonneau (2017) among others. Under the alternative, there is interdependence across linking decisions (i.e., strategic interaction). We show how to test the null with power optimized in specific directions. These alternative directions include many common models of strategic network formation (e.g., "connections" models, "structural hole" models etc.). Our random utility specification induces an exponential family structure under the null which we exploit to construct a similar test which exactly controls size (despite the the null being a composite one with many nuisance parameters). We further show how to construct locally best tests for specific alternatives without making any assumptions about equilibrium selection. To make our tests feasible, we introduce a new MCMC algorithm for simulating the null distributions of our test statistics.

In an economic model of *directed* network formation agents purposefully direct links to one another in order to maximize utility. A payoff function maps all possible network configurations into agent utilities. Agents use this payoff function to weigh the benefits of directing any particular link against the costs of doing so. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) network arises when all agents link choices are individually optimal given the choices made by other agents (e.g. Bala and Goyal, 2000).

Important examples of directed link formation in economics include firms choosing their suppliers (e.g., Atalay et al., 2011; Amelkin and Vohra, 2023), social media users choosing who to follow (e.g., Grandjean, 2016), adolescents selecting friends (e.g., Christakis et al., 2020), banks extending credit (or not) to firms (e.g., Marotta et al., 2015), and village households seeking assistance from peers in times of economic stress (e.g., De Weerdt, 2004). Jackson et al. (2017) present many other examples of networks in economics. Such data abound in other social sciences as well (e.g., Apicella et al., 2012).

The utility an agent receives when she directs a link to another agent can be usefully divided into two components.[1] The first component is "private", or, more precisely, dyadic. It is invariant to the presence or absence of other links in the network (beyond the one at hand).[2] The second component is "social", or varying with the presence or absence of other links in the network.

An example of the first component is the payoff associated with a homophilous link (McPherson et al., 2001), which depends only on the attributes of the sending (ego) and receiving (alter) agents. Another example is associated with "degree heterogeneity": agents may vary systematically in the utility they generate by directing links (out-degree heterogeneity), or in their attractiveness as link targets for others (in-degree heterogeneity). Finally, we might posit that the payoff from any particular link varies for idiosyncratic reasons, as in other random utility models (RUMs) of discrete choice (McFadden, 1974). Empirical models of network formation with these features were formally studied by Charbonneau (2017), Graham (2017), Dzemski (2018), Jochmans (2018) and Yan et al. (2018). These models are fundamentally *dyadic*: agents' network payoffs are a simple sum of link-specific payoffs and, crucially, invariant to the linking behavior of other agents.

However, in some situations, agents may also value indirect links. For example, an arc from j to k may incidentally reduce the shortest path length from i to k, allowing agent i better access to k's information (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000). While arc jk is valued by i, this value is not incorporated into j's decision to direct the arc or not. Preferences of this type mean agents' decisions impose *externalities* on others. The

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[1] In digraphs, or directed networks, it is customary to refer to edges as "arcs". Here we use the terms link, edge, arc, friendship, relationship, etc. interchangeably.

[2] "Other links" include those directed by the sending agent to targets other than the one at hand.

detection of such externalities is the subject of this paper.

When links made by one agent alter the incentives for link formation faced by others, equilibrium network configurations may diverge from socially optimal ones (Goyal, 2023). This, in turn, suggests that well-designed interventions might make agents better off. In contrast, without a wedge between the private and social benefits of link formation, equilibrium and socially optimal networks will coincide. This paper introduces a test for whether agents' own incentives to form links vary with the choices of others. A rejection of our test, *under the maintained model*, indicates the presence of externalities, with their attendant implications for optimal policy design.

An overview of the test and its uses

Strategic network formation games are complicated. In a directed network with N agents, there are $n = N(N-1)$ strategic decisions to make, and hence a total of 2^n possible action profiles or network configurations; many of which may be Nash Equilibria (NE). In the seminal model of directed network formation introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000), for example, with $N = 5$ agents there are $1,069$ NE networks. This combinatoric complexity, renders methods pioneered for the econometric analysis of discrete games with just a few players ill suited for network formation games.

In recent work, Christakis et al. (2020), Mele (2017), Miyauchi (2016), de Paula et al. (2018) and Sheng (2020) each proposed empirical models of strategic network formation.[3] Each of these models impose particular restrictions on the form of the network payoff function, the nature of any unobserved heterogeneity, and/or make assumptions about equilibrium selection. For example, Christakis et al. (2020) and Mele (2017) resolve incompleteness by assuming agents form links sequentially, allowing for the application of likelihood-based methods. Miyauchi (2016) requires a super-modular payoff function, de Paula et al. (2018) a payoff function which varies only with local network structure, while Sheng (2020) focuses on agents with a taste for transitivity. None of these papers incorporate agent-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Even with these restrictions, estimating the identified set for the parameters indexing the network payoff function in these models is challenging, as is conducting inference.[4]

Unlike this prior work, we do not consider set identification in this paper, focusing instead

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[3] de Paula (2020) surveys work in this area and provides additional references.

[4] We wish to emphasize that these "critiques" reflect the inherent difficulty of the problem, not any deficiencies in the above cited papers. Indeed these researchers have shown considerable ingenuity in proposing ways to make methods designed for games with just a few players scale to the considerably more complicated many-player network setting. We also comment that these papers don't all use the same solution/equilibrium concept.

on the more modest goal of externality *detection*. With this target question in mind, we introduce an econometric model of strategic network formation which simultaneously allows for (i) agents to value both direct and indirect links (i.e., a freely specified network benefit function), (ii) the systematic returns to link formation to vary with observed dyad attributes, and (iii) unobserved agent-specific correlated degree heterogeneity. While, relative to prior work, our focus is narrower, our model is richly featured.

Our setup maps neatly into the "costs versus benefits" payoff structures emphasized in theoretical models of strategic network formation (see, for example, Jackson (2008, Chapters 6 & 11) and Goyal (2023, Chapter 3)). Examples of models – (i) suitably enriched to include covariates, unobserved heterogeneity, and random link utility and (ii) adapted (if needed) to match our use of NE as a solution concept – encompassed by our framework include the "connections" model (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000), "structural hole" or "bridging" models (e.g., Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007; Kleinberg et al., 2008) and the favor exchange or "supported links" model of Jackson et al. (2012). We can also accommodate tastes for reciprocity, transitivity, network centrality and other forms of indirect link valuation.

We begin with a baseline dyadic logistic regression model for directed networks. Variants of this model have featured in applied social science research for decades (e.g., Bennett and Stam, 2000; De Weerdt, 2004). Early formal econometric analyses include those by Charbonneau (2017), Jochmans (2018) and Yan et al. (2018); work that built upon large-N, large-T panel data research (e.g., Fernández-Val and Weidner, 2016) and conditioning arguments used in fixed-T panel settings (e.g., Chamberlain, 1980, 2010).

The dyadic logit model is useful for modeling homophily and degree heterogeneity. We augment this model with a network payoff term, allowing agents to value indirect links. The resulting model is quite complicated. Formally it is a very large complete information simultaneous move game. While we assume that the observed network is a NE, we make no auxiliary equilibrium selection assumptions.[5]

Let K be the (finite) number of support points in the distribution of observed agent attributes and N the number of agents.[6] Our model includes (i) K^2 "homophily" parameters, collected in the $K \times K$ matrix $\Lambda \overset{def}{\equiv} [\lambda_{kl}]$ for $k, l = 1 \ldots K$, capturing how link returns vary systematically with ego and alter attributes (we define $\lambda \overset{def}{\equiv} \text{vec}(\Lambda')$), (ii) two $N \times 1$ parameter vectors $\mathbf{A} \overset{def}{\equiv} [A_i]$ and $\mathbf{B} \overset{def}{\equiv} [B_i]$ for $i = 1 \ldots N$, capturing, respectively, agent-specific out- and in-degree heterogeneity, and (iii) a scalar parameter, γ, measuring the

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[5]More precisely the observed network is either a pure strategy NE or in the support of a mixed strategy NE (in fact our results hold under an even weaker notion of equilibrium, as explained below).

[6]That K is finite with $K \ll N$ is a strong assumption; one we return to below.

extent to which agents value indirect links. Our model also includes (iv) an "equilibrium selection" function (This function assigns probabilities to all game outcomes consistent with NE equilibria for every possible realization of the $n = N(N-1)$ link-specific random utility shocks, $\mathbf{U} \overset{def}{\equiv} [U_{ij}]_{1 \leq i \neq j \leq N}$). Since we are agnostic about which NE is selected in the presence of multiple equilibria, this function is not specified by the analyst, but enters our analysis abstractly (see Theorem 1.1 below).

We treat $\delta = (\lambda', \mathbf{A}', \mathbf{B}')'$ as a (high dimensional) nuisance parameter and the equilibrium selection mechanism as a nuisance function. This focuses our attention solely on the strategic parameter γ. While, in principle, an analysis of the identified set for γ might be possible, we instead focus on the one-sided hypothesis of $H_0 : \gamma = 0$ versus $H_1 : \gamma > 0$. Or, put differently, we identify the *sign* of γ.[7]

Our test involves comparing a statistic of the observed network (e.g., its transitivity index) with a critical value derived from a reference distribution. Natural questions are: (i) which reference distribution? (ii) how do I compute the critical value? (iii) which network statistic should I use? We provide answers to all three of these questions.

There is a long tradition in empirical work of using the Ërdos-Rényi model to generate the reference distribution. This invariably results in "straw man" tests since few real world networks are well-described by the Ërdos-Rényi model. To avoid spurious rejection of the no strategic interaction null, it is therefore important to use a richer baseline model; one that might actually describe a real world network. The dyadic logit regression model with agent-specific fixed effects is one such model. Like its panel counterpart, the dyadic logit model provides a simple, easy to interpret, and random utility based, model for describing edge formation. It is sufficiently flexible to match *any* observed in- and out-degree sequence as well as rich patterns of homophilous linking. These features are important since heavy-tailed degree distributions characterize many real world networks, as does homophily (e.g., Barabási, 2016; McPherson et al., 2001). While recent research explores more flexible models of dyadic link formation (e.g., Gao, 2020; Chen et al., 2021), the logit model remains a workhorse for practitioners.

Some models of *strategic* network formation induce link clustering (e.g., Jackson et al., 2012), while others skewed degree distributions (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 2000). These same patterns of link formation can also arise for decidedly *non-strategic* reasons due to homophily and/or degree heterogeneity. The dyadic logit model, with homophily on observables as well

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[7]Our focus on one-sided hypotheses results in a particularly clean exposition and analysis, allows for the statement of some optimality results, and covers our main examples of interest. A researcher's specification of the network benefit function typically suggests whether the null-alternative pair $H_0 : \gamma = 0$ versus $H_1 : \gamma > 0$ or $H_0 : \gamma = 0$ versus $H_1 : \gamma < 0$ is most appropriate. Since a researcher can always replace a chosen network benefit function with its negative, we focus on the former case without loss of generality. Finally, as will become obvious, much of what follows extends naturally to two-sided hypotheses.

as unobserved agent-specific ego (sender) and alter (receiver) effects, therefore imposes a more stringent test for the no strategic interaction null (than an Ërdos-Rényi benchmark).

Because δ – the parameter indexing the dyadic logit null model – may range freely across its parameter space when $\gamma = 0$ our null hypothesis is a composite one. Test size equals the supremum of the rejection rate across all data generating processes (DGPs) with $\gamma = 0$. Because δ is high dimensional, the null model space is very large and constructing a test with uniformly good size and power properties is non-trivial (cf., Moreira, 2009). An additional non-standard feature of our testing problem is that the nuisance equilibrium selection function is only present under the alternative (cf., Andrews and Ploberger, 1994).

Under the logistic assumption on the random component of link utility, using a classic exponential family conditioning argument, we introduce a family of *similar* tests. Similarity means that the size of our test equals α *regardless of where we are in the null model space*. Put differently, our test is correctly-sized under null models with Λ values that result in "very little" homophily as well as under null models with Λ values that result in "lots of" homophily. Similarity also means that the size of our test does not vary with the configuration of the in- and out-degree heterogeneity vectors, **A** and **B**.

We provide an *exact* characterization of the null distributions of the test statistics in this family and, crucially, a feasible Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating from them. Simulating the null distribution requires drawing a binary adjacency matrix uniformly at random from the set of all adjacency matrices satisfying certain constraints. Constrained binary matrix simulation has numerous applications in biology, psychology, ecology and other fields (cf., Sinclair, 1993; Blitzstein and Diaconis, 2011). Unfortunately, extant simulation algorithms cannot be used to simulate the null distribution needed here; our algorithm is therefore novel and of independent interest.

We also derive the form of the locally best test under the alternative $H_1 : \gamma > 0$. Remarkably we are able to do this while remaining agnostic about equilibrium selection. Finally, because our test is exact, we also side-step difficult issues that arise when undertaking asymptotic analysis in the single network context (see Graham (2020) for references and discussion).

Possible applications of the methods introduced in this paper include:

1. **Assessing model adequacy or specification testing:** The researcher believes the baseline null model is adequate for the setting at hand, but wishes to report an omnibus goodness-of-fit test (similar to the practice of reporting the Sargan-Hansen J-Statistic in the context of GMM estimation). While a rejection in this setting is interpreted as evidence against the baseline null model, it is not interpreted as evidence in favor of any particular alternative.

2. **Detecting strategic interaction of a specific form:** The researcher's primary interest is in the specified model and she wishes to sign identify γ. In this example the analysts undertakes empirical work under the maintained assumption that *the true model is either in the null model space or in the specified alternative model space.* The data are used to determine which case prevails.

3. **Cataloging "unusual" network features:** The researcher wishes to assess whether certain features of the network in hand are "unusual". In contrast to the first case, here the researcher suspects that the network in hand is not well-described by the baseline one, but, in contrast to the second case, she remains somewhat agnostic about the form of the true model. The null model defines a set of reference networks with certain properties identical to those in the network of interest (e.g., the in- and out- degree sequences, numbers of links between agents with different covariate configurations). The researcher can compare features of interest in their network (e.g., diameter, reciprocity, support) with their distributions across the null reference set to assess whether their network is, indeed, "unusual". See Holland and Leinhardt (1976) for a discussion of this type of analysis in sociology, Section 5 of Jackson et al. (2012) for an example from economics; Milo et al. (2002) for an example from computational biology, and Gotelli (2000) for a discussion of applications to species co-occurrence analysis in ecology.

While our focus is on strategic network formation, it seems likely that the ideas developed below could be adapted to design tests appropriate for other incomplete econometric models. In recent work Chen et al. (2018) and Kaido and Zhang (2019) introduced likelihood ratio type tests applicable to incomplete models. Our test, in contrast, is a conditional score test. Conditioning, while requiring exponential family structure, is helpful in settings with a high dimensional nuisance parameter (cf., Moreira, 2009). Our score-based approach may also have computational advantages in settings where likelihood evaluation under the alternative is difficult (e.g., when enumeration of all NE is impossible).

Outline of the paper

Section 1 introduces our model of strategic network formation. We begin by defining agent preferences and characterizing equilibrium networks. Section 2 outlines our approach to testing. We first characterize the exact distribution of any statistic of the adjacency matrix under the null. Next we derive the form of the locally best test statistic for specific alternatives. Although we characterize the exact null distribution of our test statistics, for reasons of practically, we approximate this distribution by simulation. Section 3 outlines our new Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for generating random draws from the required null

distribution. Section 4 illustrates our methods in the context of the Nyakatoke risk-sharing network studied by De Weerdt (2004) and others. Section 5 finishes with a short discussion of limitations of our methods as well as a few thoughts on possible areas for additional research.

Proofs as well as some Monte Carlo simulation results are collected in a Supplemental Web Appendix. This appendix also includes a discussion of some additional applications of our MCMC simulation algorithm.

Readers interested primarily in applications can read Section 1, the first part of Section 2, and the empirical illustration of Section 4. The balance of the paper can be read later (perhaps after viewing the Python Jupyter Notebook available in the supplemental materials).

1 A family of empirical models of strategic network formation

1.1 Notation and setup

A directed graph $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{A})$ consists of a set of vertices (agents) $\mathcal{V} = \{1, \ldots, N\}$ and a set of ordered pairs of nodes, respectively called *egos* and *alters*, $\mathcal{A} = \{(i,j), (k,l), \ldots\}$ for $i \neq j$, $k \neq l$, and $i, j, k, l \in \mathcal{N}$. The elements of $\mathcal{A}$ correspond to those arcs, or directed links, present in $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{A})$.

In what follows we typically work with the adjacency matrix $\mathbf{D} = [D_{ij}]$ where

$$D_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } ij \in \mathcal{A} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \tag{1}$$

Since we rule out self-links, the diagonal of $\mathbf{D}$ consists of structural zeros.

Let $G - ij$ denote the network obtained by deleting link ij from G (if present), and $G + ij$ the network one gets after adding this link (if absent). Let $\mathbf{D} \pm ij$ denote the adjacency matrix associated with the network obtained by adding/deleting link ij from G.

The set of all $2^{N(N-1)}$ possible adjacency matrices on N labeled vertices is denoted by $\mathbb{D}_N$. Hence $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N$ is a feasible network wiring or, equivalently, a game outcome. Let $\mathbf{d}_i$ be the ith row of $\mathbf{d}$, or a pure strategy selection for agent i (i.e., a binary vector indicating which edges she chooses to direct). A pure strategy profile for all players other than i is denoted by $\mathbf{d}_{-i}$. We will sometimes refer to "players other than i" as i's *peers*.

For each agent there are $M \overset{def}{\equiv} 2^{N-1}$ possible actions, corresponding to all possible configurations of links she may direct towards her peers. A mixed strategy for agent i, $\sigma_i = (\pi_{1i}, \pi_{2i}, \ldots, \pi_{Mi})'$, is a probability distribution on these M possible pure strategy se-

lections; $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \ldots, \sigma_N)'$ is a mixed strategy profile for all N agents, while σ_{-i} is the strategy profile of agent i's peers.

1.2 Payoff function

The utility or payoff agent i gets from network $\mathbf{d}$ is

$$\nu_i\left(\mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{d}_{-i}; \theta, \mathbf{U}_i\right) = \underbrace{\gamma_0 g_i\left(\mathbf{d}\right)}_{\text{Network Benefit}} - \underbrace{\sum_j d_{ij} c_{ij}\left(X_i, X_j; \delta, U_{ij}\right)}_{\text{Link ``Costs'' (i.e., private utility)}} \tag{2}$$

with $g_i\left(\mathbf{d}\right)$ a known, but not necessarily closed-form, function of the network adjacency matrix, normalized such that $g_i\left(\mathbf{0}\right) = 0$, $\theta = (\gamma, \delta')'$, and the link "costs" function taking the form

$$c_{ij}\left(X_i, X_j; \delta, U_{ij}\right) = -\left[A_i + B_j + X_i' \Lambda_0 X_j - U_{ij}\right], \tag{3}$$

where X_i is a $K \times 1$ vector of mutually exclusive group membership indicators that *is observed* by the econometrician and $\mathbf{U}_i = (U_{i1}, \ldots, U_{ii-1}, U_{ii+1}, \ldots, U_{iN})'$ is agent i's vector of idiosyncratic logistic preference shocks over the $N-1$ possible links she can direct (and $\mathbf{U} = (\mathbf{U}_1', \ldots, \mathbf{U}_N')')$.[8] All agents observe their own, as well as their peers', preference shock vectors. As is standard in game theory (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998), we use, in a small abuse of notation, $\nu_i\left(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}; \theta, \mathbf{U}_i\right)$ to denote agent i's *expected* utility under the mixed strategy profile $\sigma = (\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i})$.

The first term in (2) captures how agent i's utility varies with the entire structure of the network; this may include benefits from direct, as well as indirect connections. The second term in (2) captures the purely private benefits to i associated with directing an arc to j. That is, the component of utility associated with arc ij that *does not vary* with the presence or absence of links elsewhere in the network.

In theoretical work $g_i\left(\mathbf{d}\right)$ is often called the *network benefit* function, while $c_{ij}\left(X_i, X_j; \delta, U_{ij}\right)$ would be typically associated with the cost of forming edge ij (e.g., Jackson, 2008; Goyal, 2023). These costs are generally assumed constant in theory research, while – as is appropriate given the empirical context – they are heterogeneous across agents and links here.[9] The placement of a negative sign in front of the second term in (2) is in keeping with the "costs" nomenclature of the theory literature, but is without loss of generality: $-c_{ij}\left(X_i, X_j; \delta, U_{ij}\right)$ is simply the portion of the payoff i gets from directing an edge to j that

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[8]More generally X_i enumerates the support points of a collection of (observed) discrete agent-specific regressors (or a partition of this support into K regions).

[9]Johnson and Gilles (2000) study the implications of cost heterogeneity on equilibrium network structure in the "connections" model.

is invariant to all other linking decisions.

While the benefit-cost nomenclature is useful for developing intuitions about the form of NE in this setting, to reiterate, what is essential here is that the first term may vary arbitrarily with **d**, and hence with peer actions, while the second term is invariant to peers' actions and, furthermore, additively separable in own actions. In what follows we call the (negative of the) j^{th} summand in the second part of (2) the *baseline utility* that i gets from directing edge ij.

Baseline utility

Considering baseline utility first, we see it is increasing in A_i and B_j. Agents with high values of *out-degree heterogeneity* A_i get a large amount of baseline utility from any link they send. In a social network context high A_i agents are "extroverts". Agents with high *in-degree heterogeneity* B_j, in contrast, are especially attractive targets, or alters, for links sent by others. In a social network high B_j agents are "prestigious" or "popular".[10]

The $X_i'\Lambda_0 X_j \stackrel{def}{\equiv} W_{ij}'\lambda_0$ term allows baseline utility to depend on whether agents assortatively match on their attributes (we define $W_{ij} \stackrel{def}{\equiv} (X_i \otimes X_j)$ and recall that $\lambda \stackrel{def}{\equiv} \text{vec}(\Lambda')$). The elements of the $K \times K$ matrix $\Lambda = [\lambda_{kl}]$ parameterize the systematic utility generated by links, say, from group k to group l. For example, in a social network girls might, all things equal, prefer other girls as friends. The Λ_0 matrix parameterizes homophily (or heterophily) of this type.

In our fixed-N setting $\{A_i\}_{i=1}^N$ and $\{B_i\}_{i=1}^N$ are fixed-dimensional parameters. We further treat $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^N$ as non-stochastic in what follows. Note that, as in fixed-effect panel data analysis, $\{(A_i, B_i)'\}_{i=1}^N$ and $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^N$ may freely correlate.[11]

The final component of baseline utility is idiosyncratic; we assume that the $\{U_{ij}\}_{i\neq j}$ are independent and identically distributed (iid) logistic random variables. The logistic assumption generates exponential family structure which we exploit when forming our test.

Equation (2) with $\gamma = 0$ gives agent preferences under our baseline or null model (essentially the dyadic link formation model studied by Charbonneau (2017)). This model, when fitted by maximum likelihood, can successfully match many features of real world networks. Specifically arbitrary in- and out-degree sequences and assortative linking patterns on discrete agent attributes (cf., Graham, 2020). The model cannot accommodate homophilous sorting on latent attributes (a limitation which may affect the interpretation of a test rejection). It

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[10]Alternatively we can think of high A_i agents as being able to direct links at low cost, and high B_j agents as being low cost alters.

[11]An implication is that $\{(A_i, B_i, X_i')'\}_{i=1}^N$ need not be i.i.d. There is no requirement, for example, that the agents in the network are a random sample from some population.

Figure 1: Network benefit function examples

[a]: Bridging   [b]: Supporting   [c]: Transitivity

Source: Authors' calculations.
Notes: Panel [a]: agent i is a bridge from k *to* j and agent l is a bridge from j to k. Panel [b]: edge ij is supported by agent k. Panel [c]: adding edge ij generates a transitive triad.

also maintains a logistic assumption on U_{ij}, a restriction relaxed by Gao (2020).

While (2) with $\gamma = 0$ underpins a growing empirical literature on networks, we are especially interested in settings where this model does not provide a good description of the network in hand.

Network benefit function

When $\gamma > 0$, the first term in (2) – the *network benefit* function $g_i(\mathbf{d})$ – enriches the baseline model to allow agent preferences over links to vary with the presence or absence of links elsewhere in the network. The researcher is free to specify the network benefit function as desired. A few selected examples, drawn from recent theoretical work on strategic network formation, gives a sense of the range of possibilities.

Example 1.1. (CONNECTIONS) In a seminal paper, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), introduced the *connections model*. In a directed variant, Bala and Goyal (2000) set $g_i(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_{i \neq j} \phi\left(\ell_{ij}\left(\tilde{\mathbf{d}}\right)\right)$ where $\tilde{\mathbf{d}}$ is the undirected network obtained from $\mathbf{d}$ (i.e., $\tilde{\mathbf{d}} = \left[\tilde{d}_{ij}\right]$ with $\tilde{d}_{ij} = 1 - (1 - d_{ij})(1 - d_{ji})$), $\phi : \{1, 2, \ldots, N-1\} \to \mathbb{R}$ is a known function with $\phi(k) > \phi(k+1) > 0$ for any $k = 1, 2, \ldots, N-1$, and $\ell_{ij}\left(\tilde{\mathbf{d}}\right)$ the shortest path length between agents i and j in $\tilde{\mathbf{d}}$. Agents prefer to be close to other agents in the network in order to easily access their information, but also wish to maintain as few links as possible, since links are costly to direct. Strong externalities arise in this model: edge ij may incidentally reduce the shortest path length between agents k and l, but such benefits are not internalized by agent i.

Example 1.2. (STRUCTURAL HOLE / BRIDGING) Kleinberg et al. (2008) introduce a model of network formation inspired by Burt's (1995) theory of "structural holes". Burt (1995) argued that individuals that connect disparate groups within a network gain "bridging", "middle-person" or inter-mediation benefits. Such benefits arise from lying on a (shortest) path connecting two agents not directly connected themselves. Kleinberg et al. (2008) emphasize the special benefits of lying on length two paths between disconnected agents. If $d_{ki}d_{ij}(1 - d_{kj}) = 1$, then i serves as a "bridge" between k and j (see Panel [a] of Figure 1.2). The summation $\sum_l d_{kl}d_{lj}(1 - d_{kj})$ yields a count of the total number of bridging agents between k and j. While agents benefit from serving as a bridge between two agents, these benefits decline in the number of other agents also serving as bridges for the same (directed) dyad. This yields a network payoff function of the form $g_i(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_j \sum_{k \neq j} \phi(d_{ki}d_{ij}(1 - d_{kj}), \sum_l d_{kl}d_{lj}(1 - d_{kj}))$ with $\phi(0, k) \equiv 0$ and $\phi(1, k) > \phi(1, k + 1) > 0$ for $k = 1, \ldots, N - 2$. See Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) for a related model.[12]

Example 1.3. (SUPPORTED LINKS, TRANSITIVITY, RECIPROCITY) Jackson et al. (2012) introduce a model where agents value supported links. Edge ij is supported by agent k if $d_{ij}d_{ki}d_{kj} = 1$ (see Panel [b] of Figure 1.2). This configuration allows agent k to monitor, or referee, relationship ij, making it more valuable. This suggests a network benefits function of $g_i(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_j d_{ij}(\sum_k d_{ki}d_{kj})$. If, instead, agents value reciprocity we would set $g_i(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_j d_{ij}d_{ji}$; while if they value transitivity in links (see Panel [c] of Figure 1.2) we would set $g_i(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_j d_{ij}(\sum_k d_{ik}d_{kj})$.

Marginal utility

Let, in an abuse of notation, $\nu_i(\mathbf{d}) \equiv \nu_i(\mathbf{d}_i, \mathbf{d}_{-i}; \theta, \mathbf{U}_i)$; the marginal utility of arc ij for agent i equals

$$MU_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = \begin{cases} \nu_i(\mathbf{d}) - \nu_i(\mathbf{d} - ij) & \text{if } d_{ij} = 1 \\ \nu_i(\mathbf{d} + ij) - \nu_i(\mathbf{d}) & \text{if } d_{ij} = 0 \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

Marginal utility measures the utility gain (loss) to agent i from adding (subtracting) link ij holding the structure of all other links in the network constant (including any other links agent i directs). The component of marginal utility associated with the network benefit function $g_i(\mathbf{d})$ plays an important role in our analysis. Define the marginal network payoff

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[12]We could, inspired by Freeman (1977), also consider the model where agents directly value their network betweenness centrality such that $g_i(\mathbf{d}) = \frac{1}{(N-1)(N-2)} \sum_{j,k \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{i\}} \frac{\text{\# of shortest paths from agents } j \text{ to } k \text{ which pass through } i}{\text{\# of shortest paths from agents } j \text{ to } k}$.

associated with agent i directing a link to j as

$$s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = \begin{cases} g_i(\mathbf{d}) - g_i(\mathbf{d} - ij) & \text{if } d_{ij} = 1 \\ g_i(\mathbf{d} + ij) - g_i(\mathbf{d}) & \text{if } d_{ij} = 0 \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

Using (2) and (5) yields a marginal utility for arc ij of

$$MU_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = A_i + B_j + W'_{ij}\lambda_0 + \gamma_0 s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) - U_{ij}. \tag{6}$$

As it features in the computation of the optimal test statistic introduced below, it is helpful to derive the form of $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d})$ for the example network benefit functions introduced earlier.

Example 1.1. (CONNECTIONS) In the connections model, when i directs a link to j she weakly reduces her shortest path length to all other agents in the network. While there is no closed form expression for $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d})$ in the connections model, it is straightforward to compute shortest path lengths between agents numerically (many network manipulation software libraries include routines to do this). If removing (adding) arc ij increases (decreases) i's distance to many other agents in the network, then $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d})$ will be large.

Example 1.2. (STRUCTURAL HOLE / BRIDGING) For the bridging network benefit function $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d})$ equals

$$s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_{k \neq j} \phi\left(d_{ki}(1 - d_{kj}), 1 + \sum_{l \neq i} d_{kl}d_{lj}(1 - d_{kj}) \right).$$

The marginal utility of edge ij is therefore increasing in the number of agents k which direct edges to i, but not to j. It is decreasing in the number of agents l and k in which edges kl and lj are present (but edge kj is not).

Example 1.3. (SUPPORTED LINKS, TRANSITIVITY, RECIPROCITY) In the support model $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_k d_{ki}d_{kj}$, which is simply a count of how many agents would support edge ij if it were formed. When agents have a taste for transitivity we have instead

$$s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_k d_{ik}d_{kj} + \sum_{k \neq j} d_{ik}d_{jk}$$

which is a count of how many transitive triads (involving agent i) would be created if edge ij is added. Finally if agents have a taste for reciprocity we have $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = d_{ji}$; indicating that the marginal utility of edge ij varies with the presence or absence of the reciprocal edge ji.

1.3 Equilibrium networks

We assume that the observed network $\mathbf{D}$ coincides with the equilibrium outcome of an N-player complete information game. Each agent (i) observes $\{(A_i, B_i, X_i')\}_{i=1}^N$ and $\{U_{ij}\}_{i \neq j}$ and then (ii) decides which, out of the $N-1$ other agents, to send links to. Agents may play mixed strategies.

A mixed strategy profile σ^* is a NE when $\theta = \theta_0$ and $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{u}$, if for all $i = 1, \ldots, N$,

$$\nu_i\left(\sigma_i^*, \sigma_{-i}^*; \theta_0, \mathbf{u}_i\right) \geq \nu_i\left(\mathbf{d}_i, \sigma_{-i}^*; \theta_0, \mathbf{u}_i\right) \tag{7}$$

for all possible pure strategy selections $\mathbf{d}_i$. We assume that the *observed* network $\mathbf{D}$ is either a pure strategy NE or in the support of a mixed strategy NE.[13]

Assumption 1.1. (DATA GENERATING PROCESS)

1. (NON-STOCHASTIC $\mathbf{X}$) Let $\mathcal{V} = \{1, \ldots, N\}$ be the N agents in the network in hand, each with a *fixed* (i.e., non-stochastic) group membership of X_i.

2. (LOGISTIC PREFERENCE SHOCKS) Let $\mathbf{U} = [U_{ij}]_{i \neq j}$ be an $N(N-1)$ vector of i.i.d. logistic link preference shocks observed by all agents.

3. (NASH EQUILIBRIUM) Let $\theta_0 \in \Theta$ be the parameter indexing the payoff function (2). The observed network $\mathbf{D}$ is either a pure strategy NE or contained in the support of a mixed strategy NE of the strategic form game $\left(\mathcal{V}, \mathbb{D}_N, \{\nu_i(\cdot, \cdot; \theta_0, \mathbf{U}_i)\}_{i \in \mathcal{V}}\right)$.

Treating $\mathbf{X}$ as non-stochastic simplifies both notation (allowing us to suppress, for example, the dependence of payoffs on $\mathbf{X}$) and analysis (see the proof to Theorem 1.1 below). It is also without loss of generality. In our setting there is no asymptotic thought experiment and the fixed N sampling distribution we consider conditions on $\mathbf{X}$ throughout. Randomness across hypothetical replications of the network formation game are due soley to variation in $\mathbf{U}$ and any randomness in NE selection (see below).

---

[13]Observe that agent i must consider 2^{N-1} different pure strategy deviations in order to verify that their chosen strategy is optimal. This may be unrealistic when N is large. A weaker equilibrium requirement, akin to the notion of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for undirected networks, is to require agents to only consider the effects of adding or deleting a *single* link at time on their utility.

Under this weaker stability notion, which we call *single deviation stable* (SDS), we only require that the marginal utility of any link present in the network is non-negative, while that of any link not present is negative. This implies that the observed network $\mathbf{D}$ satisfies the system of $N(N-1)$ non-linear equations

$$D_{ij} = \mathbf{1}\left(A_i + B_j + W_{ij}'\lambda_0 + \gamma_0 s_{ij}(\mathbf{D}) \geq U_{ij}\right)$$

for $i, j = 1, \ldots, N$ and $j \neq i$. While we maintain the NE assumption in what follows, it turns out that our test is also valid if, instead, the observed network is only SDS. Although single deviation stability is a natural directed analog of pairwise stability, we are not aware of this equilibrium concept being considered before.

1.4 Likelihood

In the presence of multiple NE, Assumption 1.1 imposes no restrictions on which one is actually realized in the observed network. Our strategic network formation model is *incomplete*. Although we remain agnostic about equilibrium selection, it is nevertheless useful to establish notation for how the unknown selection rule generates an assignment of probability weights to different game outcomes. Doing so allows us to write down a (well-defined) likelihood for the network, albeit abstractly.

Let $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta)$ be a function which assigns, for $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{u}$, a probability weight to network $\mathbf{d}$:

$$\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta) : \mathbb{D}_N \times \mathbb{R}^n \to [0, 1] \tag{8}$$

In order for $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \cdot; \theta)$ to be a consistent with NE it must satisfy the conditions of Definition 1.1.

Definition 1.1. (EQUILIBRIUM WEIGHT FUNCTION) For $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{u}$ the realized vector of logistic link preference shocks and θ_0 the payoff function parameter, let $\mathbf{d}^*(\mathbf{u}; \theta_0)$ be a pure strategy NE or a network contained in the support of a mixed strategy NE and $\mathbb{D}_N^*(\mathbf{u}; \theta_0)$ be the set of all such networks. Function (8) is such that (i) $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta_0) \geq 0$ for all $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N^*(\mathbf{u}; \theta_0)$ (ii) $\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N^*(\mathbf{u}; \theta_0)} \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta_0) = 1$ and (iii) $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta_0) = 0$ for all $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N \backslash \mathbb{D}_N^*(\mathbf{u}; \theta_0)$.

If $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \cdot; \theta)$ satisfies the conditions of Definition 1.1, then the likelihood of observing network $\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{d}$ is

$$P(\mathbf{d}; \theta, \mathcal{N}) = \int_{\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{R}^n} \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta) f_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathbf{u}) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{u}, \tag{9}$$

where $f_{\mathbf{u}}(\mathbf{u}) = \prod_{i \neq j} f_U(u_{ij})$ with $f_U(u) = e^u / [1 + e^u]^2$. Of course, for the likelihood (9) to be well-defined we require that $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \cdot; \theta)$ is measurable.

Theorem 1.1. (LIKELIHOOD) *For any network $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N$ there exists a measurable function $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \cdot; \theta) : \mathbb{R}^n \to [0, 1]$, which assigns to $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ a NE weight on the pure strategy combination corresponding to $\mathbf{d}$.*

The proof of Theorem 1.1 can be found in Appendix A.1. It follows directly from ideas in Beresteanu et al. (2011).

Observe that $\mathcal{N}$ does not assign probabilities to the selection of particular NE, rather it assigns weights directly to pure strategy combinations. Consistency of these weights with NE requires that they only be positive when the combination in question is either (i) a pure strategy NE or (ii) in the support of a mixed strategy one.

2 Testing for strategic interaction

In this section we introduce a model adequacy test for the dyadic logit null (the baseline model). We then show how to optimize the power of this test in certain directions of the alternative model space.

We begin by describing how to assess the adequacy of the baseline model as a description of the network in hand. Utilizing a conditioning argument we construct an *exact* test of the null of "correct specification". An alternative model is not explicitly formulated in this case, although researcher intuitions about plausible directions of mis-specification typically guides the choice of test statistic. As shown by Lehmann and Romano (2005, Theorem 14.6.1, p. 619), it is impossible to construct a test with power (greater than size) in all possible directions of mis-specification.

Next we consider applications where the analyst carefully specifies the alternative model (through an explicit choice of the network benefit function, $g_i(\mathbf{d})$). Here the researcher believes the true network formation model lies in either the null or the (specified) alternative model space; the purpose of testing is to decide which situation prevails. In this second application, we seek to construct a test which rejects with high probability when the alternative is true, while continuing to control size under the null.

The mechanics of testing in both cases are the same, the difference lies solely in the choice of test statistic. This allows us to build up our results in a cumulative fashion. In sub-section 2.1 we show how the exponential family structure of the model under the null of no strategic interaction allows us to construct similar tests. Specifically we control size exactly by conditioning on the minimally sufficient statistic for the null model parameter, δ. With these basics established, we show in sub-section 2.2 how to optimize power in the direction of a particular alternative. This step is non-trivial since under the alternative the network formation game may exhibit multiple equilibria.

Throughout, and crucially, we wish to remain agnostic about the distribution of any degree heterogeneity across agents as well as the form of any homophily and/or heterophily. Let Δ denote a subset of the $K^2 + 2N$ dimensional Euclidean space in which $\delta_0 = (\lambda_0, \mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{B}_0)$ is, a priori, known to lie. For technical reasons we assume that Δ contains a $K^2 + 2N$ dimensional rectangle. The null model parameter space is

$$\Theta_0 = \{(\gamma, \delta') \,:\, \gamma = 0, \delta \in \Delta\}. \tag{10}$$

Our null hypothesis is the *composite* one:

$$H_0 \,:\, \theta \in \Theta_0 \tag{11}$$

since δ may range freely over $\Delta \subset \mathbb{R}^{K^2+2N}$ under the null.

Under the null the likelihood is $P_0(\mathbf{d};\delta) \overset{def}{\equiv} P(\mathbf{d};(0,\delta')', \mathcal{N}_0)$ with

$$\mathcal{N}_0(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta) = \prod_i \prod_j \mathbf{1}\left(A_i + B_j + W_{ij}'\lambda \geq u_{ij}\right)^{d_{ij}}$$
$$\times \mathbf{1}\left(A_i + B_j + W_{ij}'\lambda < u_{ij}\right)^{1-d_{ij}}.$$

Under the null the unique "equilibrium" network is the one where all links with positive marginal utility are present and those with negative marginal utility are not. Uniqueness follows from the fact that agents' best responses are constant in the strategy profiles of their peers when $\gamma = 0$. Consequently the marginal utility of edge ij is invariant to the presence or absence of links elsewhere in the network.

Evaluating the integral (9) under the null yields

$$P_0(\mathbf{d};\delta) = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{j \neq i} \left[\frac{\exp\left(W_{ij}'\lambda + R_i'\mathbf{A} + R_j'\mathbf{B}\right)}{1 + \exp\left(W_{ij}'\lambda + R_i'\mathbf{A} + R_j'\mathbf{B}\right)}\right]^{d_{ij}}$$
$$\times \left[\frac{1}{1 + \exp\left(W_{ij}'\lambda + R_i'\mathbf{A} + R_j'\mathbf{B}\right)}\right]^{1-d_{ij}}, \tag{12}$$

where R_i is the $N \times 1$ vector with a 1 in its ith element and zeros elsewhere.[14]

2.1 Testing without explicit specification of the alternative (i.e., baseline model adequacy analysis)

Under the null our likelihood, $P_0(\mathbf{d};\delta)$, is a member of the exponential family. To see this it is helpful to establish some additional notation. The *out-* and *in-degree sequences* equal:

$$\mathbf{S} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{S}_{\text{out}} \\ \mathbf{S}_{\text{in}} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} D_{1+}, \ldots, D_{N+} \\ D_{+1}, \ldots, D_{+N} \end{pmatrix}. \tag{13}$$

Here $D_{+i} = \sum_j D_{ji}$ and $D_{i+} = \sum_j D_{ij}$ equal the in- and out-degree of agents $i = 1, \ldots, N$.

The $K \times K$ *cross-link matrix* equals

$$\mathbf{M} = \sum_i \sum_j D_{ij} X_i X_j'. \tag{14}$$

---

[14]Variants of this likelihood are analyzed by Chatterjee et al. (2011), Charbonneau (2017), Graham (2017), Jochmans (2018), Dzemski (2018) and Yan et al. (2018). See also Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016).

This matrix summarizes the inter-group link structure in the network (homophily). The kl^{th} element of $\mathbf{M}$ records the number of links sent by type k agents to type l agents.

Let $\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{M}$ be a degree sequence and cross-link matrix. We say $\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{M}$ is *graphical* if there exists at least one arc set $\mathcal{A}$ such that $G(\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{A})$ is a simple directed graph with degree sequence $\mathbf{S}$ and cross link matrix $\mathbf{M}$. We call any such network a *realization* of $\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{M}$. The set of all possible realizations of $\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{M}$ is denoted by $\mathbb{G}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}$. $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}$ denotes the associated set of possible adjacency matrices:

$$\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}} \stackrel{def}{\equiv} \{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N \ : \ (d_{1+}, \dots, d_{N+}) = \mathbf{S}_{\text{out}}, \tag{15}$$

$$(d_{+1}, \dots, d_{+N}) = \mathbf{S}_{\text{in}}, \ \sum_i \sum_j d_{ij} X_i X_j' = \mathbf{M} \Big\}.$$

Let $\mathbf{T} = \left(\text{vec}\,(\mathbf{M}')', \mathbf{S}_{\text{out}}, \mathbf{S}_{\text{in}} \right)'$. Note that associated with any graphical realization of $\mathbf{T}$ is a corresponding set of adjacency matrices $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}$.

With this notation established it is easy to verify that the family of network formation models under the null of no strategic interaction constitutes an exponential family.

Lemma 2.1. *(i)* $\mathcal{P}_{0,\delta} = \{P_0(\mathbf{d}; \delta) \ : \ \delta \in \Delta\}$ *is an exponential family with* $\mathbf{t}$ *a boundedly complete sufficient statistic for* δ,[15] *(ii) its probability mass function* (12) *can be rewritten as:*

$$P_0(\mathbf{d}; \delta) = c(\delta) \exp\left(\mathbf{t}'\delta\right), \ \delta \in \Delta, \ \mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N, \tag{16}$$

with $c\,(\delta) \stackrel{def}{\equiv} \left[\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_N} \exp\left(\left[\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j \neq i} d_{ij} \left\{ W_{ij}'\lambda + R_i'\mathbf{A} + R_j'\mathbf{B} \right\} \right] \right) \right]^{-1}.$

Proof. See Appendix A.2. $\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\quad\square$

The sufficient statistics for the $K^2 + N + N$ elements of the nuisance parameter δ, are (i) the cross link matrix, (ii) the out-degree sequence and (iii) the in-degree sequence.

Under H_0 the conditional likelihood of the event $\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{d}$ is

$$P_0\left(\mathbf{d} \mid \mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}\right) = \frac{P_0\left(\mathbf{d}; \delta\right)}{\sum_{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}} P_0\left(\mathbf{v}; \delta\right)} = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}|} \tag{17}$$

if $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ and zero otherwise. Under the null of no strategic interaction all networks with the same in- and out-degree sequences and cross link structure are equally likely. Importantly this conditional likelihood is invariant to the actual value of the nuisance parameter δ.

By conditioning on $\mathbf{T}$, which is sufficient for δ, we isolate the information in the data that is relevant for assessing model adequacy (Barndorff-Nielsen and Cox, 1994). This follows

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[15]A sufficient statistic is (boundedly) complete if, for all (bounded) functions $k\,(\mathbf{t})$, $\mathbb{E}_0\left[k\,(\mathbf{T})\right] = 0$ for all $P_0(\mathbf{d}; \delta) \in \mathcal{P}_{0,\delta}$ implies that $k\,(\mathbf{T}) = 0$ almost everywhere. See Section 3.6 of Ferguson (1967).

because conditional on $\mathbf{T}$, the null model *completely* specifies the distribution of $\mathbf{D}$. Consequently, the distribution of any statistic of the adjacency matrix, say $R(\mathbf{D})$, is also fully specified. Specifically the null distribution of $R(\mathbf{D})$ is the one induced by a discrete uniform distribution on $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}$:

$$\Pr\left(R(\mathbf{D}) \leq r \mid \mathbf{T}; \theta \in \Theta_0\right) = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|} \sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}\left(R(\mathbf{d}) \leq r\right). \tag{18}$$

To test model goodness-of-fit/adequacy, we simply check whether the value of $R(\mathbf{D})$ in the network in hand is at an extreme quantile of this distribution. If it is, we take this as evidence against the baseline (null) model.

Similarity and conditioning

A test with critical function $\phi(\mathbf{D})$ will have size α if its null rejection probability (NRP) is less than or equal to α for *all* values of the nuisance parameter:

$$\sup_{\theta \in \Theta_0} \mathbb{E}_\theta\left[\phi(\mathbf{D})\right] = \sup_{\gamma=\gamma_0, \delta \in \triangle} \mathbb{E}_\theta\left[\phi(\mathbf{D})\right] = \alpha. \tag{19}$$

Since the nuisance parameter δ is very high dimensional, size control is *a priori* non-trivial. For some intuition as to why, consider, as an example, the case where $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = \sum_k d_{ki}d_{kj}$, such that agents' have a taste for supported links when $\gamma_0 > 0$. A natural test statistic in this case would be some function of $\mathbf{D}$ that is increasing in the number of supported links in the network.[16] The researcher would then reject the null of $\gamma_0 = 0$ when this statistic is large enough. Unfortunately, the expected number of supported links varies dramatically under the null depending on the value of δ. Certain configurations of $\mathbf{A}$, $\mathbf{B}$ and/or λ may result in a network with substantial link clustering (and hence support) *even when agents' have no taste for support per se*. If we choose a fixed critical value for rejection then, depending on the values of $\mathbf{A}$, $\mathbf{B}$ and/or λ, size may be very poor.

To avoid any size distortion induced by variation in δ over $\triangle \subset \mathbb{R}^{K^2+2N}$ we exploit the exponential family structure of our model (under the null). Let $\mathbb{T} = \{\mathbf{t} : \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{m} \text{ is graphical}\}$ be the set of possible sufficient statistics $\mathbf{T}$. Instead of choosing a fixed critical value, which may result in under- or over-rejection, depending on the value of δ, we proceed conditionally on $\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{T}$, varying our critical value with $\mathbf{T}$. In this way we ensure good size control. By conditioning on $\mathbf{T}$ we can also remain agnostic about its marginal distribution (and hence the value of δ, for which $\mathbf{T}$ is sufficient).

---

[16]Jackson et al. (2012) suggest the fraction of links in the network which are supported.

Formally, for each $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{T}$ we form a test with the property that, for all $\theta \in \Theta_0$,

$$\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[\phi\left(\mathbf{D}\right) | \mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t} \right] = \alpha. \tag{20}$$

Such an approach ensures *similarity* of our test since, by iterated expectations,

$$\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[\phi\left(\mathbf{D}\right) \right] = \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[\mathbb{E}_\theta \left[\phi\left(\mathbf{D}\right) | \mathbf{T} \right] \right] = \alpha \tag{21}$$

for any $\theta \in \Theta_0$ (Ferguson, 1967). By proceeding conditionally we ensure that the NRP is unaffected by the value of δ.

For any $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{T}$ we can construct an *exact* test, as is required by (20), because our model completely specifies the distribution of networks conditional on $\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}$ under the null. Condition (21) follows immediately. Using some well-known results from the theory of exponential families, we can make the stronger claim that similarity is only possible by conditioning.

Lemma 2.2. (SIMILARITY) *Any similar test of $H_0 : \theta \in \Theta_0$ satisfies (20) for all $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{T}$.*

Proof. By Lemma 2.1 above, $\mathbf{T}$ is a boundedly complete sufficient statistic for θ under the null. The claim then follows from Ferguson (1967, Definition 4 and Theorem 2, Section 5.4). $\qquad \square$

Implementation

For concreteness let $R(\mathbf{D})$ be the network reciprocity index (Newman, 2010):

$$R(\mathbf{D}) = \frac{2\hat{P}_{11}}{2\hat{P}_{11} + \hat{P}_{01}}, \tag{22}$$

where

$$\hat{P}_{01} = \frac{2}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{N} \left[D_{ij} \left(1 - D_{ji} \right) + \left(1 - D_{ij} \right) D_{ji} \right] \tag{23}$$

equals the fraction of dyads which take an unreciprocated or "asymmetric" configuration and

$$\hat{P}_{11} = \frac{2}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{N} D_{ij} D_{ji} \tag{24}$$

the fraction which take a reciprocated or "mutual" configuration.

A conditional test based upon $R(\mathbf{D})$ will have a critical function of

$$
\phi(\mathbf{d}) = \begin{cases} 1 & R(\mathbf{d}) > c_\alpha(\mathbf{t}) \\ g_\alpha(\mathbf{t}) & R(\mathbf{d}) = c_\alpha(\mathbf{t}) \\ 0 & R(\mathbf{d}) < c_\alpha(\mathbf{t}) \end{cases} \tag{25}
$$

where the values of $c_\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ and $g_\alpha(\mathbf{t}) \in [0,1]$ are chosen to satisfy the requirement that $\mathbb{E}_\theta[\phi(\mathbf{D})|\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}] = \alpha$. Specifically, given the sufficient statistic $\mathbf{T}$ we first compute:

$$
c_\alpha(\mathbf{T}) = \min\left\{ c \in \mathbb{R} \ : \ \frac{1}{|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|} \sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}(R(\mathbf{d}) > c) \leq \alpha \right\}. \tag{26}
$$

Second we set $g_\alpha(\mathbf{T})$ according to

$$
g_\alpha(\mathbf{T}) = \frac{\alpha - \frac{1}{|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|}\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}(R(\mathbf{d}) > c_\alpha(\mathbf{T}))}{\frac{1}{|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|}\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}(R(\mathbf{d}) = c_\alpha(\mathbf{T}))}.
$$

Observe that, formally, the test is randomized. Because the adjacency matrix is a discrete random variable, with finite support, it will generally not be possible to find a $c \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|^{-1}\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}(R(\mathbf{d}) > c)$ *exactly* equals α. In such cases, the econometrician instead chooses the highest $c \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|^{-1}\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}(R(\mathbf{d}) > c)$ is *strictly less than* α. She then probabilistically rejects when $R(\mathbf{D}) = c$ to ensure proper size. In typical uses cases, the cardinality of the set $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}$ will be intractably large, such that a researcher can just use a non-randomized test in practice. That is, she will be able to find a $c \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $|\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}|^{-1}\sum_{\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{S},\mathbf{M}}} \mathbf{1}(R(\mathbf{d}) > c) \approx \alpha$ to such a high level of accuracy that there will be little gained from using a randomized decision rule. In such settings, it would be difficult to accurately compute $g_\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ in any case since the event $R(\mathbf{d}) = c_\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ will occur with low probability. This will become clearer when we discuss simulation of the null distribution below.

Under the null all adjacency matrices with the $\mathbf{S} = \mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{m}$ are equally probable. By enumerating all adjacency matrices in $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ we could exactly compute the null distribution of $R(\mathbf{D})$ and hence the critical values $c_\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ and $g_\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ defined above. In general such a brute force approach will be infeasible.[17] Therefore a method of approximating the exact null distribution is required. The simulation algorithm introduced in Section 3 below provides

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[17]In fact very little is known about the set $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$; for example we are aware of no method for checking whether a given $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{m}$ pair is graphic. From related settings we believe that the cardinality of $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ will typically be intractably huge even for modestly-sized networks. See Blitzstein and Diaconis (2011) for discussion of this point, as well as some examples, from a related setting.

such a method.

The intuition behind this test is straightforward. If the network in hand has an "unusually" large value of $R(\mathbf{D})$ relative to the set of all networks with same in- and out-degree sequences and cross-link matrices, then we reject the null that the baseline model is correctly specified. A rejection is not interpreted as evidence in favor of a particular alternative model. Relatedly, a feature of goodness-of-fit tests, including this one, is that we have may have low, or even power equal to size, in certain directions (Lehmann and Romano, 2005).

Observe that the test is exact, involving no appeal to approximations associated with an asymptotic thought experiment.

2.2 Optimal testing with an explicit alternative

In this subsection we discuss how to optimize our test when the alternative model space is explicitly specified. That is, when the researcher explicitly specifies the network benefit function in (2) and proceeds under the premise that the true network generating process lies either in the null or the (explicitly specified) alternative model space. In such settings a rejection provides evidence that $\gamma_0 > 0$ (in the context of a specific network benefit function). Naturally the researcher would like to maximize her power to reject, while continuing to maintain similarity. To accomplish this requires choosing the right test statistic.

Because an equilibrium selection mechanism is not explicitly specified under the alternative, likelihood ratio (LR) testing is not feasible (cf., Chen et al., 2018). As an alternative to a LR test, we instead choose, for each $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{T}$, the critical function, $\phi(\mathbf{D})$ to maximize the *derivative* of the (conditional) power function $\beta(\gamma, \mathbf{t}) = \mathbb{E}[\phi(\mathbf{D})|\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}]$ evaluated at $\gamma = 0$ subject to the (conditional) size constraint $\mathbb{E}_\theta[\phi(\mathbf{D})|\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}] = \alpha$. Such a $\phi(\mathbf{D})$ is *locally best* (Ferguson, 1967, Lemma 1, Section 5.5). Remarkably we show that the locally best test does not depend upon the form of the equilibrium selection mechanism $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{d}, \mathbf{u}; \theta)$.

Differentiating the power function we get[18]

$$\left.\frac{\partial\beta(\gamma, \mathbf{t})}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0} = \mathbb{E}\left[\phi(\mathbf{D})\,\mathbb{S}_\gamma(\mathbf{D}|\mathbf{T}; \theta)|\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}\right] \tag{27}$$

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[18]Differentiability of the likelihood function is formally established by Theorem 2.3 below.

with $\mathbb{S}_\gamma\left(\mathbf{d}\,|\,\mathbf{t};\theta\right)$ denoting the conditional score function

$$\mathbb{S}_\gamma\left(\mathbf{d}\,|\,\mathbf{t};\theta\right) = \frac{1}{P_0\left(\mathbf{d};\delta\right)} \left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0} - \sum_{\mathbf{v}\in\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}} \left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{v};\theta\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0}$$

$$= \frac{1}{P_0\left(\mathbf{d};\delta\right)} \left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0} + k\left(\mathbf{t}\right)$$

and $k\left(\mathbf{t}\right)$ only depending on the data through $\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{t}$. (Here, and in the balance of this section, it is understood that δ is evaluated at the population value δ_0.) By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, the test with the critical function given by equation (25) above, where the test statistic, $R\left(\mathbf{d}\right)$, is set equal to the log-likelihood gradient, $\frac{1}{P_0\left(\mathbf{d};\delta\right)} \left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0}$, will be locally best within the class of similar tests.

The idea behind the locally best test is as follows. If the likelihood increases sharply as we move away from the null *in the direction of the alternative of interest*, then we take this as evidence against the null. Intuitively if the likelihood gradient in the neighborhood of the null is large, then the likelihood ratio will also be large for simple alternatives close to the null (i.e., when $\gamma \in (0, \epsilon]$).

Constructing the locally best critical function requires calculating $\frac{1}{P_0\left(\mathbf{d};\delta\right)} \left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0}$. This is not straightforward since it depends on properties of the likelihood *under the alternative* (and consequently the equilibrium selection function). Nevertheless, we are able to derive the form of this derivative.

Theorem 2.3. (LOCALLY BEST TEST) *(i) $P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta,\mathcal{N}\right)$ is twice differentiable with respect to γ at $\gamma = 0$. Its first derivative at $\gamma = 0$ is*

$$\left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta,\mathcal{N}\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0} = P_0\left(\mathbf{d};\delta\right)$$

$$\times \left[\sum_{i\neq j} s_{ij}\left(\mathbf{d}\right)\left\{d_{ij}\frac{f_U\left(\mu_{ij}\right)}{\int_{-\infty}^{v_{ij}} f_U\left(u\right)\mathrm{d}u} - (1-d_{ij})\frac{f_U\left(\mu_{ij}\right)}{\int_{v_{ij}}^{\infty} f_U\left(u\right)\mathrm{d}u}\right\}\right], \quad (28)$$

where $\mu_{ij} = A_i + B_j + X_j'\Lambda_0 X_i$ equals the systematic, non-strategic, component of utility generated by arc ij and f_U is the logistic density; (ii) the test statistic $R\left(\mathbf{d}\right) = \frac{1}{P_0\left(\mathbf{d};\delta\right)} \left.\frac{\partial P\left(\mathbf{d};\theta\right)}{\partial\gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0}$ yields the locally best test in the direction of the specified alternative within the class of similar tests.

The proof of Theorem 2.3, along with some additional commentary, can be found in Section A.3 of the Supplemental Web Appendix. A key implication of Theorem 2.3 is that the form of the locally best test statistics does *not* depend upon $\mathcal{N}$, and hence the equilibrium

selection mechanism. This is essential, since optimal testing would not be feasible otherwise (at least without additional assumptions). One intuition for this finding is that equilibrium is unique with high probability when γ is close to zero. This means we can effectively ignore draws of $\mathbf{U}$ which lead to multiple equilibria when differentiating the likelihood.

Indeed, when γ is close to zero most players will have a strictly dominant strategy (that is the optimal set of links for them to send will be invariant to the play of their peers). Of course we need more information to recover the gradient with respect to γ, since this parameter measures the responsiveness of agents to their peers' actions. It turns out that a key scenario used in the derivative calculation involves considering draws of $\mathbf{U}$ where all players *except one* have strictly dominant strategies. The one player without a strictly dominant strategy provides the needed gradient information. This player's actions are sensitive to the play of their peers' – this delivers non-trivial gradient information – but NE is still unique in this scenario such that the details of equilibrium selection do not matter. In the proof we show that the effect of realizations of $\mathbf{U}$ associated with multiple NE is negligible when γ is small enough.

Locally best vs. heuristic test statistics

With a little manipulation we can simplify (28) to:

$$\frac{1}{P_0(\mathbf{d};\delta)} \left.\frac{\partial P(\mathbf{d};\theta)}{\partial \gamma}\right|_{\gamma=0} = \sum_{i \neq j} [d_{ij} - F_U(\mu_{ij})] s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) \tag{29}$$

where $F_U(u) = e^u/[1 + e^u]$ is the logistic CDF. This form of the statistic provides insight into how our test accumulates evidence against the null in practice. Consider the case where $s_{ij}(\mathbf{d}) = d_{ji}$, as would be true when agents' have a taste for reciprocated links. Observe that $F_U(\mu_{ij})$ corresponds to the probability of the edge ij under the null. Therefore the optimal test statistic is large if we observe that many ij links *with low probability under the null* are reciprocated. It is not many reciprocated links that drives rejection per se, but the presence of many "unexpected" reciprocated links.

Consider a network of boys and girls with agents exhibiting a strong taste for gender-based homophily. The optimal test statistic in this case is the *conditional* sample covariance of D_{ij} and D_{ji} given (A_i, B_i, X_i) and (A_j, B_j, X_j). The test based upon the reciprocity index is – essentially – based upon the *unconditional* covariance. The effect of conditioning is to, for example, give more weight to heterophilous reciprocated links than to homophilous ones. Similarly we give more weight to reciprocated links across low degree agents, than to those across high degree agents.

We close by observing that the locally best property, like similarity, is a *non-asymptotic* one. In our "finite sample" setting we can say nothing about test consistency. We also note that optimality is in the region of $\gamma_0 = 0$. Test power does not have to be monotonic in γ_0 as we move far from zero. This is a feature of many other score tests.

Implementation

Two practical issues remain. The first, how to simulate the null distribution of the test statistic, is covered in the next section. Second, although the locally best test statistic does not depend on the details of equilibrium selection, it does depend on δ_0. Although the test will remain admissible when δ_0 is replaced by some other, perhaps arbitrary, δ, it will not be locally best.

A practical solution to this problem is to replace δ_0 with its joint maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) computed under the null. This particular MLE is elegantly studied by Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016) (see also Yan et al. (2018)). We emphasize that the feasible test based on the MLE is no longer locally best. When δ_0 is poorly estimated, as may occur when **D** is sparse, the power of the feasible test could be appreciably lower than that of the oracle.[19] The feasible test remains admissible.

Nevertheless, in our Monte Carlo experiments, some of which are reported in the Supplemental Web Appendix, we have found that replacing δ_0 with its MLE, results in a test which is nearly as powerful as the infeasible oracle test based on δ_0, and far more powerful that tests based on ad hoc statistics. This is true even in the "sparse" designs we consider. Of course this finding is specific to the particular experiments we considered. It would be interesting to study how to choose $\delta \in \Delta$ rigorously. While replacing δ_0 with a "good guess" seems sensible, what constitutes a "good guess" in this setting is a a topic we leave for future research.

3 Simulation: drawing uniformly at random from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$

Because a complete enumeration of $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ is not feasible unless N is very small, making our test practical requires a method of constructing uniform random draws from this set. Such draws can be used to simulate the null distribution of any test statistic of interest.

The problem of simulating networks with fixed degree sequences is well-studied; with many domain specific applications (e.g., Sinclair, 1993). We add to this problem the additional requirement that the simulated network satisfies the cross-link matrix constraint.

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[19]We thank a referee for raising this concern.

Prior work on network simulation adopts one of two basic approaches. The first approach begins with an empty graph and randomly adds links. Links need to be added such that the end graph satisfies the degree sequence constraint. Blitzstein and Diaconis (2011) develop an algorithm along these lines. They cleverly use checks for graphicality of a degree sequence, available in the discrete math literature, to add links in a way which constrains the end graph to be in the target set.[20]

The second approach, to which our new method belongs, uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Specifically an initial graph, satisfying the target constraints, is randomly rewired many times to create a new graph from the target set. Key to this approach is ensuring that each rewiring is compatible with the target constraints (e.g., maintains the network's degree sequence). The algorithm also needs to be constructed carefully to ensure that the end graph is a *uniform* random draw from the target set. Sinclair (1993), Rao et al. (1996), McDonald et al. (2007), Berger and Müller-Hannemann (2009) and Tao (2016) all developed MCMC methods for simulating graphs (or digraphs) with given degree sequences.

We are aware of no method of generating adjacency matrix draws from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$. The novelty of this problem, relative to the work described above, is the presence of the additional cross link matrix constraint, $\mathbf{M}$. In the discrete math literature the cross link matrix constraint corresponds to what is called a partition adjacency matrix (PAM) constraint. Czabarka et al. (2021) conjecture that determining whether a given $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{m}$ pair is graphical, the PAM realization problem, is NP-complete. If their conjecture is correct (and NP $\neq$ P), using a Blitzstein and Diaconis (2011) type algorithm to draw from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ is not feasible.

This leaves MCMC methods. Erdős et al. (2017) showed that naively incorporating a PAM constraint into existing MCMC algorithms destroys their correctness. In this section we introduce a new MCMC algorithm that *does* generate uniform random draws from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$. This algorithm is of independent interest. Before describing the algorithm we introduce some additional definitions and notation.

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[20]See also Del Genio et al. (2010) and Kim et al. (2012). Graham and Pelican (2020) provide a textbook discussion of the Blitzstein and Diaconis (2011) algorithm.

3.1 Notation and definitions

We start by defining an alternating walk.

Definition 3.1. (ALTERNATING WALK) An alternating walk H is a sequence of (ordered) dyads of the form

$$H := (i_1, i_2), (i_3, i_2), (i_3, i_4), \ldots, (i_l, i_{l-1}) \tag{30}$$

or

$$H := (i_2, i_1), (i_2, i_3), (i_4, i_3), \ldots, (i_{l-1}, i_l) \tag{31}$$

with $i_k \in \mathcal{V}(G)$, $i_k \neq i_{k+1}$, $i_k \neq i_{k-1}$ and
(i) if $(i_k, i_{k-1}) \in \mathcal{A}(G)$, then $(i_k, i_{k+1}) \notin \mathcal{A}(G)$
(ii) if $(i_k, i_{k-1}) \notin \mathcal{A}(G)$, then $(i_k, i_{k+1}) \in \mathcal{A}(G)$
(ii) if $(i_{k-1}, i_k) \in \mathcal{A}(G)$, then $(i_{k+1}, i_k) \notin \mathcal{A}(G)$
(iv) if $(i_{k-1}, i_k) \notin \mathcal{A}(G)$, then $(i_{k+1}, i_k) \in \mathcal{A}(G)$
for all $k = 2, \ldots, l - 1$.

For brevity we will often refer to a walk simply by its node sequence, writing $H := i_1 i_2, \ldots, i_l$.

To unpack Definition 3.1 it is easiest to consider an example. Observe that for $H := i_1 i_2, \ldots, i_l$, the adjacency matrix entries $D_{i_1 i_2}, D_{i_3 i_2}, \ldots, D_{i_l i_{l-1}}$ alternate between ones and zeros (or zeros and ones). This observation suggests a method of constructing an alternating walk via a sequence of "hops" across the adjacency matrix: pick row i_1 of the adjacency matrix and move horizontally to column i_2, where i_2 corresponds to one of the agents to which i_1 directs a link, next move vertically to row i_3, where i_3 is an agent which does not direct a link to i_2, and so on.[21] We call the horizontal moves *active steps* and vertical moves *passive steps*. Figure 2 provides an example construction. The different cases in Definition 3.1 correspond to walks beginning/ending with passive/active steps.[22]

The length of an alternating walk equals the number of ordered dyads used to define it. An important type of alternating walk, which following Tao (2016), we call an *alternating cycle*, is central to our algorithm.

Definition 3.2. (ALTERNATING CYCLE) The alternating walk C is an alternating cycle if $i_1 = i_l$ and C has even length.

The length of an alternating cycle is at least four. Let $D_{i_1 i_2}, D_{i_3 i_1}, \ldots, D_{i_l i_{l-1}}$ be the

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[21]This description is essentially due to (Tao, 2016, p. 124).

[22]Figure 6, Panel B, in the Supplemental Web Appendix provides some additional examples of alternating walks.

Figure 2: Constructing an alternating walk

A: Alternating Walk

B: Degree Sequence

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j		Indegree	Outdegree
a	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	a	0	2
b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	b	1	0
c	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	c	2	2
d	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	d	1	0
e	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	e	1	1
f	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	f	0	2
g	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	g	2	0
h	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	h	2	2
i	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	i	2	0
j	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	j	0	2

Source: Authors' calculations.

Notes: Panel A depicts an alternating walk $j, g, a, b, c, d, e, c, a$ constructed using the adjacency matrix. The same altering walk is colored blue in Figure 2. Agent labels are given in the first column and row of the table. To construct such a walk randomly we begin by choosing an agent at random. Here agent j is chosen, with an ex ante probability of $\frac{1}{10}$ since there are ten agents in the network. Next we take an active step where one of agent j's outlinks is chosen at random. Here we choose the outlink to agent g, an event with an ex ante probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ since agent j has just two outlinks. Following the active step comes a passive step. In a passive step we move vertically to the row of an agent which does not direct a link to the current agent. Here we choose a from the set $\{a, b, c, d, e, f, i\}$ uniformly at random (i.e., with an ex ante probability of $\frac{1}{7}$). We continue with active and passive steps until we choose to stop or can proceed no further. Panel B reports the in-degree and out-degree of each agent in the network. Observe that in active steps the probability of any feasible choice equals the inverse of the out-degree of the current agent. In passive steps the probability of any feasible choice equals the inverse of the number of nodes minus the in-degree of the node chosen in the prior step minus 1 (since $i_k \neq i_{k+1}$). We can also construct alternating walks by the above procedure, but instead starting with a passive step. The shaded cells in the table shows which edges (ones) and non-edges (zeros) are in the walk.

sequence of adjacency matrix entries associated with alternating cycle C in $\mathbf{D}$. These entries necessarily form a sequence of zeros and ones (or ones and zeros).

Consider constructing an alternative digraph, say $\mathbf{D}'$, by replacing all the "ones" in the alternating cycle C with "zeros" and all "zeros" with "ones". Rewiring $\mathbf{D}$ in this way is degree preserving: $\mathbf{D}'$ has the same in- and out-degree sequence as $\mathbf{D}$. We refer to such operations as "switching the cycle" (since we switch the zeros and ones).

We use random alternating walks on the network in order to find alternating cycles. We then use these alternating cycles to rewire the network. This motivates the definition of what we call a schlaufe. A schlaufe is either an alternating walk which contains an alternating cycle (as the last part of the walk) or it is an alternating walk which cannot be continued. More precisely

Definition 3.3. (SCHLAUFE) An alternating walk $H := i_1 i_2 \dots i_l$ is a *schlaufe* if either
(i) There is a node $i_k \in \{i_1 i_2 \dots i_l\}$ with $k \neq l$ such that $i_k = i_l$ and $(k - l) \bmod 2 = 0$. Furthermore for any two nodes i_j and i_h in $\{i_1 i_2 \dots i_{l-1}\}$ with $i_j = i_h$ and $j \neq h$ it holds that $(j - h) \bmod 2 = 1$.
(ii) At node i_l there is no other node i_{l+1} such that the alternating walk could be extended with the "unmarked" (unused, see Algorithm 2) link (i_l, i_{l+1}).

In German schlaufe corresponds to "loop", "bow" or "ribbon" (its plural is schlaufen); the latter translation is evocative of our meaning here. In the first case the schlaufe will coincide with an alternating walk which includes exactly one alternating cycle.[23] Visually schlaufen of the first type, with the nodes appropriately placed, will look like loops and ribbons. In the second case the schlaufe does not include an alternating cycle.

Associated with a schlaufe, denoted - in a small abuse of notation – by say R, is a $K \times K$ violation matrix which records the number of extra links from group k to group l generated by switching the alternating cycle in R (if there is one). Consider an alternating rectangle, $C := abcda$, consisting of two boys and two girls. If initially one boy directs a link to the other and one girl directs a link to the other, then after switching the cycle the violation matrix will equal:

Ego \Alter	Boy	Girl
Boy	-1	1
Girl	1	-1

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[23]The requirement that $i_k = i_l$ and $(k - l) \bmod 2 = 0$ ensures that $C = i_k i_{k+1} \dots i_l$ is an alternating cycle (imposing even length). The "furthermore..." requirement ensures that if another node is visited multiple times it does not form an alternative cycle (imposing non-even length). See Figure 6 for an example.

After switching the cycle there are too few same gender links and too many mixed gender ones.

We call a sequence of schlaufen $\mathcal{R} = (R_1, \ldots, R_k)$ feasible if (i) the cycles of the schlaufen are link disjoint and (ii) the sum of their violation matrices is zero (and for $i < k$ the sum of their violation matrices is not zero).

Conventional MCMC adjacency matrix re-wiring algorithms work by switching short cycles (e.g., alternating rectangles and compact alternating hexagons as in Rao et al. (1996)). Switches of this type, while preserving the in- and out-degree sequence of the network will typically generate networks with the wrong inter-group link structure (i.e., non-zero link violation matrices). Our approach to solving this problem involves switching many alternating cycles simultaneously such that their individual link violation matrices sum to zero.

3.2 The MCMC algorithm

Let $\mathbf{S} = \mathbf{s}$ and $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{m}$ be the degree sequence and cross link matrix of the network in hand. In order to a draw, say $\mathbf{D}'$, from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ we (i) start with a realization of $(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{m})$, say $\mathbf{D}$, (ii) randomly construct (link disjoint) schlaufen, and (iii) switch any alternating cycles in them. While switching cycles will preserve the degree sequence, it may – as discussed earlier – result in a graph without the appropriate cross link matrix. In order to ensure that $\mathbf{D}'$ has the appropriate cross link matrix, we construct schlaufen until either the sum of their violation matrices equals zero or we stop randomly. If the sum of the schlaufen violation matrices is zero we move to $\mathbf{D}'$ from $\mathbf{D}$ by switching the cycles, otherwise we set $\mathbf{D}' = \mathbf{D}$. Proceeding in this way ensures that $\mathbf{D}'$ is, in fact, a random draw from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$. After sufficiently many iterations of this process we show that a graph constructed in this way corresponds to uniform random draw from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$. A formal statement of the procedure is provided by Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 uses a subroutine to find schlaufen. This subroutine, described in Algorithm 2, finds and marks a schlaufe in the graph.

Appendix A.4, provides additional discussion of the MCMC algorithm as well as proof of its correctness.

Theorem 3.1. *Algorithm 1 is a random walk on the state graph Φ which samples uniformly a network from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ for $\tau \to \infty$.*

Proof. See appendix A.4. □

Algorithm 1 MARKOV DRAW ALGORITHM

Inputs: An adjacency matrix $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$; a mixing time τ
Procedure:

1. Set $t = 0$.

2. With probability $1 - q$ go to step 3, with probability q go to step 4.

3. find and mark a schlaufe (see Algorithm 2):

   (a) **if** the sum of the schlaufen violation matrices is zero, then

      i. switch the cycles in the schlaufen (changing the adjacency matrix $\mathbf{d}$),
      ii. unmark all links,
      iii. go to step 4.

   (b) **else**

      i. with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, go to step 3 or
      ii. with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, unmark all links and go to step 4.

4. Set $t = t + 1$

   (a) **if** $t = \tau$ then return $\mathbf{d}$
   (b) **else** go to step 2

Output: A uniform random draw $\mathbf{d}$ from $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$

**Algorithm 2** SCHLAUFEN DETECTION ALGORITHM

Inputs: An adjacency matrix $\mathbf{d} \in \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ (this network may have marked links in it)
Procedure:

1. Choose an agent/node, say i, at random.

2. Mark agent i as active and

   (a) **if** feasible, randomly choose one of $i's$ (unmarked) outlinks, say to j, and go to step 3;

   (b) **else** (i.e., no unmarked outlinks available) go to step 6.

3. Mark edge ij, chosen in step 2 and

   (a) **if** agent j is already marked passive, then go to step 6;

   (b) **else** go to step 4.

4. Mark agent j, chosen in step 3, as passive and

   (a) **if** feasible, randomly choose an agent, say k, from among those who *do not* direct links to j, and go to step 5,

   (b) **else** go to step 6.

5. Mark edge kj, with k the agent chosen in step 4, as passive and

   (a) **if** agent k is already marked active, then go to step 6;

   (b) **else** go to step 2.

6. return the (marked) adjacency matrix, the constructed schlaufe and its violation matrix.

Output: A schlaufe, its violation matrix and a marked adjacency matrix.

Figure 3: Nyakatoke Village Risk-Sharing Network

● Wealth < 300,000 TSh & Muslim	● Wealth < 300,000 TSh & Lutheran	● Wealth < 300,000 TSh & Catholic
● 300,000 TSh ≤ Wealth < 600,000 TSh & Muslim	● 300,000 TSh ≤ Wealth < 600,000 TSh & Lutheran	● 300,000 TSh ≤ Wealth < 600,000 TSh & Catholic
● Wealth ≥ 600,000 TSh & Muslim	● Wealth ≥ 600,000 TSh & Lutheran	● Wealth ≥ 600,000 TSh & Catholic

Source: De Weerdt (2004) and authors' calculations.

Notes: Each household is colored according to their land and livestock wealth (measured in Tanzanian Shillings) and religion. The arrow head on the edges points to the "alter" household with the link being sent by the tail "ego" household.

4 Empirical illustration: risk-sharing links when agents value bridging capital

De Weerdt (2004) studied the formation of risk-sharing links across 119 households in the rural village of Nyakatoke (located in Tanzania). He asked all adult individuals in the village who they could rely upon for help and, from their responses, constructed a network of directed links across households.[24]. The resulting set of links is shown in Figure 3.

Modeling the configuration of links shown in Figure 3 as a NE of a complete information network formation games is reasonable in our setting. For example, the observed network may correspond to the long-run rest point associated with an un-modeled dynamic network formation process. The small village rural setting of Nyakatoke is consistent with agents having high levels of information about their own and others' payoffs. Finally we interpret the De Weerdt (2004) prompt at face value: households report who they would – in fact – turn to in a time of need.

Here we assess whether households value "bridging capital", as suggested by Burt (1995) and formalized in game-theoretic terms by Kleinberg et al. (2008) and others. If k directs a link to i but not to j, then i, by directing a link to j, may position herself to serve as a "bridge" or "broker" between k and j. See Figure 1.2 above.

In the formal model of Kleinberg et al. (2008) agents gain utility from positioning themselves on length two paths connecting agents not directly connected themselves; however such utility gains are decreasing in the number of "rival" length two paths (i.e., those with other agents in the center). This suggest, for example, a network benefit function of

$$g_i\left(\mathbf{d}\right) = \sum_j \sum_{k \neq j} \frac{D_{ki} D_{ij} \left(1 - D_{kj}\right)}{\max\left(1, \sum_l D_{kl} D_{lj} \left(1 - D_{kj}\right)\right)}. \tag{32}$$

In this formulation any "bridging" capital is shared equally across all agents l on length two paths from j to k (with arc jk absent). For example, if there are two bridging agents situated between j and k, they each get half the benefit and so on. The marginal network benefit of edge ij is thus

$$s_{ij}\left(\mathbf{d}\right) = \sum_{k \neq j} \frac{D_{ki} D_{ij} \left(1 - D_{kj}\right)}{\max\left(1, \sum_l D_{kl} D_{lj} \left(1 - D_{kj}\right)\right)}, \tag{33}$$

from which the form of the locally best test follows.

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[24]The prompt used by De Weerdt (2004) is suggestive of both mutuality and directionality, leading to some ambiguity in whether to interpret the collected edges as undirected or directed. Comola and Fafchamps (2014) present evidence suggesting that the links given by households are directed. Specifically that they indicate to which other households they would turn to in the event of need. It is this interpretation that we give the links here.

From De Weerdt (2004) we also know that household land and livestock wealth, as well as religion (Catholic, Lutheran or Muslim), are important drivers of link formation in Nyakatoke. We divide households into three wealth bins, which in conjunction with religion, partitions households into nine groups; X_i consists of the nine resulting group membership dummies with the 81 elements of Λ parameterizing any homophily/heterophily across these groups. The remaining null model parameters are the $238 = 119 \times 2$ household-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity parameters. This gives $\dim(\delta) = 2 \times 119 + 9 \times 9 = 319$ null model "nuisance" parameters. It is hard to imagine a testing approach with good properties in this setting which would not involve "conditioning away" the null model parameter.

One aim of our empirical illustration is to compare the performance of the locally best test statistic, which follows naturally from the form of the Kleinberg et al. (2008) network benefit function, to that of heuristically motivated *ad hoc* test statistic.

It is not entirely clear how to form a heuristic test with power to detect the more qualitative alternative "agents like to bridge disconnected groups". Indeed, this lack of clarity is one argument for using a locally best test. Such tests proceed in a principled way from an explicit network benefit function.

After some experimentation we settled on the difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the empirical distribution of *betweenness-centrality* across agents in the network as a suitable *ad hoc* test statistic (other measures of dispersion give similar results).

The reasoning behind this choice is as follows. As before, let $\tilde{\mathbf{d}}$ denote the undirected network obtained from $\mathbf{d}$. Next let $\phi_i^{jk}(\tilde{\mathbf{d}})$ denote the number of paths between j and k in $\tilde{\mathbf{d}}$ which pass through i and $\phi^{jk}(\tilde{\mathbf{d}})$ the total number of paths connecting j and k (whether they pass through i or not).

Agent i's *betweenness centrality* (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 190) equals:

$$C_i^{\mathrm{BC}}\left(\tilde{\mathbf{d}}\right) = \sum_{j<k} \frac{\phi_i^{jk}(\tilde{\mathbf{d}})}{\phi^{jk}(\tilde{\mathbf{d}})}. \tag{34}$$

Equation (34) is maximal when i is situated on every path between every pair of connected agents. When $\tilde{\mathbf{d}}$ is connected, this maximal value equals the number of dyads excluding i or $\binom{N-1}{2} = \frac{(N-1)(N-2)}{2}$.

The "90-50 gap" in the empirical distribution of $C_i^{\mathrm{BC}}\left(\tilde{\mathbf{d}}\right)$ measures right-tail inequality in betweenness centrality. If agents value bridging capital, then it is plausible that the top 10 percent of agents in the network will acquire substantially more of such capital – as proxied by betweenness centrality – than the typical (or median) agent.

The intuition behind this claim is that acquiring bridging capital is inherently rivalrous; the addition of links by other agents may reduce one's own betweenness centrality. Competi-

tion to accumulate bridging capital should therefore lead to more dispersion in betweenness-centrality across agents (than in a reference set of null model graphs). Winners of this competition (the 90th percentile) will have more bridging capital than the typical agent (the 50th percentile) in the network.

We wish to emphasize that the "ad hoc" descriptor of this statistic is apt. The reasoning outlined above is both meandering and speculative; we provide it simply as an example of how one might select a test statistic heuristically. In contrast, an advantage of the formalism of an explicit network benefit function is that it gives precision to the alternative of interest (in turn suggesting a suitable, in fact, optimal test statistic).[25]

The left panel of Figure 4 plots simulation estimates of the distribution of the $90 - 50$ betweenness-centrality gap across three reference sets of networks: (i) Ërdos-Rényi graphs with the same number of links as observed in Nyakatoke, (ii) the set of all graphs with the same in- and out-degree sequences as observed in Nyakatoke, and (iii) the set of all graphs which additionally constrain the number of cross-group links to be the same as observed in Nyakatoke. The vertical line in the figure marks the value of the actual $90 - 50$ betweenness-centrality gap in Nyakatoke.

The three reference distributions in Panel A allow us to undertake three model adequacy tests: is Nyakatoke well-described by (i) the Ërdos-Rényi model, (ii) a directed β-model which places equal probability on all networks with the same in- and out-degree sequence as in Nyakatoke, or (iii) by the full baseline model described above (which additionally accommodates homophily)? In all three cases we reject, but notice that as we enrich the null model the simulated reference distributions shift to the right.[26] Put differently a portion of the dispersion in betweenness-centrality across households observed in Nyakatoke is likely a by-product of degree heterogeneity and homophily. The rightward shifts in the reference distributions as we enrich the null model is indicative of how using a realistic null model may be important for avoiding spurious rejections in practice. That said, our decisive rejection of even the 319 parameter baseline model model indicates that degree heterogeneity and wealth/religion homophily cannot explain *all* of the inequality in betweenness-centrality we observe across agents in Nyakatoke.

The right panel of Figure 4 plots the null distribution of the locally best test statistic for the alternative that households gain utility by bridging disconnected pairs of agents (as formalized by Kleinberg et al. (2008)). If we are willing to maintain that the true data

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[25]Of course one can also start with a specific test statistics and then reverse engineer a network benefit function for which it is locally best. We do not advocate proceeding in this way in practice, but such an exercise can be useful for understanding the game theoretic implications of test statistics initially proposed in other settings. We thank the co-editor for this observation.

[26]The incremental effect of additionally controlling for homophily is modest.

Figure 4: Testing for bridging/brokerage preferences

Source: De Weerdt (2004) and authors' calculations.
Notes: Panel A presents MCMC estimates of the *distribution* of the $90 - 50$ betweenness-centrality gap across agents for three reference sets of networks (as listed in the legend). Panel B shows the null distribution of the locally best test described in the main test. In this panel the reference set is all networks with the same in- and out-degree sequences and cross-link matrix as observed in Nyakatoke.

generating process is either in the null or specified alternative model space, we can interpret a rejection as evidence *for* γ_0 being positive. To implement this test we replace δ_0 with its maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) computed under the null.[27] As is clear from Panel B of Figure 4, we decisively reject the null.

Panel B is also suggestive of the power gains associated with the locally best test. If we were to standardize each of our test statistics using their respective reference distribution's mean and standard deviation, it is obvious that the locally best test statistic is more extremely positioned in the right tail of its null distribution (the Monte Carlo experiments reported in the Supplemental Web Appendix confirm the power advantages of the locally best test).

Using Algorithm 1 requires a choice of the mixing time parameter τ. Although the mixing properties of our MCMC procedure are largely unexplored, we have found - by Monte Carlo experimentation – that choosing τ such that each edge in the input graph is, on average, swapped at least once before the resulting output is considered a uniform random draw from the target set to yield acceptable results in practice. We use this approach here (also see the Python Juypter Notebook in the Supplemental Materials). The required value for τ is increasing in the dimension of the nuisance parameter δ and especially in the dimension of Λ. Hence the speed of the simulation algorithm declines in both N and K.

5 Limitations and future research

The analysis in this paper, like much of the wider econometrics literature on games, is likelihood based. Our null model is fully parametric (albeit flexibly-so), while the alternative, due to the unmodeled NE selection function, is semiparametric. Under correct specification our test reveals whether $\gamma_0 = 0$ or $\gamma_0 > 0$ (with a researcher-specified *exact* Type I error rate, and a locally best Type II error rate). That is, we present a method for detecting whether agents form links "strategically" in the presence of any pattern of homophily and degree heterogeneity allowed by the baseline null model.

It would be interesting to know whether detecting strategic interaction in the presence of *arbitrary* homophily on observables and degree heterogeneity is possible. We know from the panel data literature that detecting state-dependence in the presence of heterogeneity is non-trivial and that modeling details matter (e.g., Chamberlain, 1985). Analogous questions arise here.

Our set-up assumes that the researcher is able to a priori partition the support of agents'

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[27]The computation of this MLE is described in detail by Yan et al. (2018) and implemented in our Python package **ugd** for "uniform graph draw". Additional discussion can be found in the Python Jupyter notebooks included in the Supplemental Materials.

covariates into K regions along which all homophilous sorting occurs. In practice this is an approximation. Developing data-based discretization rules (e.g., using clustering algorithms) and formalizing the nature of the approximations involved would be useful. It is possible that recent results on randomization inference by Canay et al. (2017) could be useful for such an analysis.

We conjecture that, for K sufficiently large, further increases in it will reduce power. In contrast, too coarse of a covariate partition could lead the researcher to reject not because of any strategic interaction, but simply because the baseline model is misspecified.[28] Note our test correctly rejects the null in this case, the subtlety centers upon interpretation. Such concerns arises in other specification testing problems.[29] Our test could also reject in the presence of homophily on *latent* attributes.

Key to our set-up is the exponential family structure (under the null) induced by the assumption of logistic random link-specific utility. While this is a strong assumption, it comes with considerable pay-off: we are (i) able to *exactly* control size in (ii) the presence of a high dimensional nuisance parameter while (iii) also making no assumptions about equilibrium selection. Exponential family structure has proved highly fruitful in other areas of econometrics; applications in panel data being most closely connected to the present setting. Our similarity and local optimality results build on classic results in the theory of testing in exponential families (e.g., Ferguson (1967) and Lehmann and Romano (2005)).

Recent work studies dyadic regression in settings richer than our baseline model (e.g., Gao, 2020). Adapting such work to our testing problem would be an interesting area for future research. The loss of exponential family structure would mean a loss of exact size control and optimality. However, the insight that score tests in the direction of certain alternatives can be constructed without modeling the details of NE selection should still hold. Any such extension would require difficult asymptotic arguments; but we expect insights from the large-N, large-T panel data literature (e.g., Fernández-Val and Weidner, 2016) as well as the large games literature (e.g., Menzel, 2016) to be useful in any such extension.

While obvious, and generic to most testing problems, it is important to understand that our test may have low power in some directions (in extreme cases even power equal to size). As an example imagine agents gain utility from linking with popular agents (as in preferential attachment models), such that $g_i\left(\mathbf{d}\right) = \sum_{j\neq i} d_{ij}\left[\sum_{k\neq i} d_{kj}\right]$. This model yields $s_{ij}\left(\mathbf{d}\right) = \sum_{k\neq i} d_{kj}$, which is almost equal to the in-degree of agent j. Hence the distribution of $s_{ij}\left(\mathbf{D}\right)$ across $\mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{s},\mathbf{m}}$ will be nearly degenerate. Examples of this type are not unique to our

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[28]We thank the referees for this observation.

[29]For example a Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions might reject in the linear instrumental variables setting because one of the instrument exclusion restrictions is violated or because of treatment effect heterogeneity; with rather different implications for how to proceed in each case.

setting. See Lehmann and Romano (2005) for general impossibility results.

Finally, while we are able to prove that our simulation algorithm works for τ "large enough", we don't currently have a formal handle on the mixing properties of our MCMC algorithm. This is not just a limitation of our work, but of much of the related work in the discrete math and computer science literature (e.g., Cooper et al. (2007) and Erdos et al. (2018)). Our limited simulation experiments suggest relatively fast mixing. [30]

These limitations notwithstanding, we nevertheless see potential for the widespread use of the methods presented in this paper in empirical social and economic network research (and, with modification, in other settings where strategic interaction is important). We hope that the ability to easily embed formal game-theoretic models of network formation of the type surveyed by, for example, Jackson (2008) and Goyal (2023) into heterogeneity-rich dyadic linking models will be attractive to empirical researchers. While not emphasized here, we also expect our simulation algorithm to find use in other settings where binary matrix simulation is an important part of researchers' tool-kits (e.g., Gotelli, 2000). Finally our focus on score type tests may represent a fruitful direction for further research on testing in incomplete models (e.g., Chen and Kaido, 2021).

The Supplemental Web Appendix shows how to adapt our results to bi-partite networks. There we show how ideas in this paper might be used to, for example, study airline entry into different routes as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). The set-up allows for complex airline preferences over their own route map as well as the route maps chosen by their competitors. We also shows how our simulation algorithm can be used for more traditional conditional likelihood estimation and inference problems. A carefully annotated Python Jupyter Notebook illustrating how the methods in this paper work in practice is available in the Supplemental Materials.

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[30]A simple heuristic is to increase τ until one's results are not sensitive to further increases in it.

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